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For more than a decade there has been a tendency for social
democratic and labour parties in the developed capitalist world to
move to the right. A variety of explanations have been offered.
These include discussions of loss of political direction, sometimes
underpinned by shifts in the class composition ofthe parties or the
impact of a new stage of internationalized capitalism. l Far less
attention has been paid to two other factors. One is the impact of the
period of relative economic stagnation on a global level, which has
affected all countries with significant social democratic parties since
the mid 1970s. This has, through higher levels of unemployment,
contributed to another widespread influence on social democratic
politics, lower levels of working-class self-confidence and hence of
trade union and other struggles with employers and governments,
despite some impressive but short-lived upsurges, notably in France,
Italy and Greece, during the 1990s.
For example, Stuart Wilks, "Class Compromise and the International
Economy: The Rise and Fall of Swedish Social Democracy," Capital and
Class, 58 (Spring 1996),89-112 and John Wiseman, "A Kinder Road to Hell?
Labor and the Politics of Progressive Competitiveness in Australia," in Leo
Panitch, ed., Are There Alternatives? Socialist Register (London 1996),
93-117, esp. 97.
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The following account does not examine the adequacy ofdiffer-
ent attempts to explain social democracy's rightward trend. It does
not question the undoubted validity ofmany ofthe criticisms ofthe
practices ofthe parliamentary left today. Nor does it take issue with
the argument that this trend represents an important adaptation to
the realities of late twentieth-century capitalism. My concern is to
challenge the conclusion ofsome effective critics ofcontemporary
social democracy that there has been a fundamental break in
national social democratic traditions. Colin Leys, for example, after
identifying the "historic mission" of the British Labour Party "to
counterpose social need to the selfishness of the market and its
socially destructive effects," asserts that "New Labour has, in
effect, finally broken with [the] idea ofthe party as a vehicle for the
aspirations and ideas of a social movement, the expression of any
kind of collective will.,,2 The French Socialist Party's politics
underwent "a cultural revolution," according to George Ross.
"Earlier, capitalism was to be rejected and transcended. Henceforth
a 'mixed economy' would rebuild France's competitiveness in the
capitalist international economy.,,3 Their position implies or ex-
plicitly promotes the possibility of reviving "real" 'or "genuine"
social democracy.
Graham Maddox makes a similar argument about the Australian
Labor Party (ALP). The Labortradition, he argues, was "betrayed"
under Bob Hawke's leadership.4 It is possible to assess the idea of
a fundamental discontinuity in social democratic policy by exam-
ining a range of policies and structures.5 Here, I take issue with
Maddox's general position and hence with those who take parallel
2 Colin Leys, "The British Labour Party's Transition from Socialist to
Capitalism" in Leo Panitch, ed., Are There Alternatives, 26-7.
3 George Ross, "The Changing Face ofPopular Power in France," in Frances
Fox Piven, ed., Labor Parties in Postindustrial Societies (New York 1992),
90-1. /
4 Graham Maddox, The Hawke Governlnent and Labor Tradition (Ringwood
1989),4. .
5 See Rick Kuhn, "A Comment on Maddox and Battin, Johnson and
Manning," Australian Journal ofPolitical Science, 27, 2 (1992), 357-61.
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stances on other social democratic parties by examining the history
of its foreign policies in particular.
There is no doubt that the foreign policies of the ALP did not
cover the Party in glory during its continuous period in office
between 1983 and 1996, under Prime Ministers Bob Hawke and,
from late 1991, Paul Keating. Labor sought to maintain the estab-
lished order ofaccess for foreign (especially Australian) capital to
the resources ofPapua-New Guinea (PNG), until 1975 effectively
an Australian colony. The indifference ofthe PNG Government to
the effects ofAustralian based company CRA's giant copper mine
on the island ofBougainvilIe led local people to organize an armed
resistance movement. The insurgents closed down the mine in 1989
and then drove PNG forces from Bougainville. Australia provided
military assistance to PNG by training personnel, providing ongo-
ing financial aid and key hardware, notably helicopters, to help
suppress the movement.6 Without these measures the PNG govern-
ment could not have sustained its war against the people of Bou-
gainville and retaken parts ofthe island.
The Labor Governments' level ofcommitment to human rights
is amply displayed in their continuing indifference to the right to
self-determination ofthe East Timorese. Keating suggested that the
Clinton Administration should tone down its criticism of human
rights abuses in both Indonesian and China.? In 1995 he argued that
the applications for refugee status of East Timorese who had
reached Australia should be denied because they were not only
Indonesian but also Portuguese citizens.8 This was shortly after the
ALP had argued in the International Court of Justice that Portugal
had no political or economic status in East Timor. In 1995 the
Government signed a military treaty with the generals who ran
6 See D. Oliver, Black Islanders: A Personal Perspective of Bougainville,
1937-1991 (Melbourne 1991), 230-1 and Australian Statements on Papua
New Guinea, Vol. 1 (Canberra 1990-0ctober 1993), 84-148.
7 T. Burton, "Keating Cools His Advice on Human Rights in Asia," Australian
Financial Review, 15 September 1993, 13.
8 Gerard Noonan, "Speaking Softly Makes Us Cowards," Canberra Times,
12 October 1995, 13.
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Indonesia, the first such arrangement with any country since the
1960s. This general approach facilitated the 1989 Treaty with
Indonesia on oil exploration in the seas between Australia and
Timor, the Timor Gap, and the efforts ofAustralian capital to profit
from the rapid growth ofthe Indonesian economy under Suharto's
military regime.9 In addition, Indochinese refugees, so called "boat
people," were interned for years and deprived of legal advice,
cultural and educational facilities in remote north-western Austra-
lia.
In 1990 the Hawke Government enthusiastically, though with
one rather than both hands, grasped the opportunity to help the
United States overcome the "Vietnam syndrome" through war in
the Persian Gulf. Australia's contribution, a few frigates and some
other naval and medical personnel, was cheap and safe compared to
that of the USA and other allies. But it showed good faith. What is
more, "Australia's decision to become involved in the Gulf does
not appear to have emanated from a direct request by the US
Government although there is no doubt the US Government wel-
comed it as part ofits efforts in developing an international momen-
tum to enforce the UN sanctions."IO The logic of this decision
paralleled that which took Australia into Vietnam under the conser-
vative Liberal Prime Minister Bob Menzies, that is, a concern to
push the United States into playing a more aggressive role in
policing the world.
Australia also participated in the USlUnited Nations adventure
in Somalia, justified as an effort to bring food (at a time when the
famine was in any case easing) and peace (three years later US
marines had to be sent in again so that the last United Nations
personnel could withdraw under their cover). Labor's own great
9 See, for example R. Callick, "Australian Makes It Mining Indonesia,"
Australian Financial Review, 29 March 1993, 15.
10 M. Cockburn, "The Politics ofAustralian Involvement," in M. Goot and R.
Tiffin, Australia's GulfWar (Melbourne 1992),44.
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international "peace" initiative also took place under the umbrella
of the United Nations during the early 1990s. Australia intervened
in Cambodia to engineer a settlement which minimized the influ-
ence ofboth the Khmer Rouge, backed by China, and Vietnam. The
success ofthe operation is perhaps better measured by the telecom-
munications and other contracts Australian corporations (including
state-owned Telstra) won in Indochina and its contribution to
Australia's economic and political profile in southeast Asia than by
the level of peace and well-being it bestowed on the people of
Cambodia.
The problem with Maddox's argument about discontinuity in
the history ofthe ALP is not, therefore, a matter ofoverly negative
or uncharitable assessments of recent developments. The problem
is his rose-tinted view of the more distant past. The following
argument seeks to demonstrate that Labor' s foreign policies during
the 1980s and 1990s were not an aberration. The pattern of ALP
policy has been, and continues to be, shaped by two broad sets of
factors: the Party's "material constitution," its relationships with
different social classes, and the logic of capital accumulation in
Australia, including its relationships with world capitalism. Nei-
ther ofthese have been frozen since the 1890s when the Labor Party
was formed. But both have been characterized by fundamental
continuities.
The nature ofthe Labor Party and the significance of its nation-
alism are considered in the next section. The history of Labor's
foreign policy over the long period before the Vietnam War is then
explored in an account whose originality lies in the attempt at a
Marxist synthesis rather than reliance on primary sources. The
ALP's position on the Vietnam War is the focus of the following
more detailed discussion. This episode requires attention because
the ALP's progressive historical credentials in foreign policy cur-
rently rely, to a very large degree, on misconceptions about its
attitudes to Australia's involvement in Vietnam. The final substan-
tive section offers a further summary account of the Labor Party's
stance in the period after the Vietnam War.
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The Australian Labor Party and Nationalism
Even before Federation in 1901, Australian society was over-
whelmingly organized on the basis of production for local and
international markets. Australian prosperity has depended on the
stability of world capitalism to provide outlets for Australian
exports; strategic imports, particularly capital and intermediate
goods; and inflows of investment. Given the size ofthe Australian
population (less than 3.8 million in 1901, rising to 7.6 million in
1947 and to over 18 million in 1994) governments have never been
in a position to exert a major influence on world political relations.
But they have maintained or sought powerful allies which had
similar interests.
The Labor Party has always been one of the two main political
parties at the Commonwealth level and has formed the federal
government for 34 ofthe last 95 years. Two basic continuities have
characterized the Party during the twentieth Century. The follow-
ing sections demonstrate that these have consistently shaped the
ALP's foreign policies.
First, the ALP is a social democratic party in the sense that it has
a working-class base and has a structure which reflects its parlia-
mentary orientation. It is geared to winning elections and operates
within the broad parameters of the existing state. Today the main-
stream ofthe Labor Party openly proclaims its commitment to more
rational and humane capitalism. In the past, the same orientation
was sometimes justified in terms of the amelioration of capitalism
into socialism. But the ALP still retains a base in the working class,
which it not only mobilizes electorally but also relates to through
trade unions. Union officials play an important role within the
Labor Party both formally, if their unions are affiliated and hence
are entitled to representation at State Conferences, and informally
as activists and Party office holders. The role of Labor Parliamen-
tarians in politics is a partial political analogue to that of union
officials in economic affairs. Both mediate between the state and
capital and their working-class constituents, though the ability of
workers to influence Labor MPs is much more attenuated than their
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capacity to exert pressure on their union officials. The ALP has also
been characterized by internal cleavages and factions which, at
least indirectly, reflect the rival pressures from the Party's working-
class base and the requirements ofmanaging Australian capitalism,
that is, meeting the needs ofthe capitalist class whose well-being is
an index ofnational economic stability and prosperity. I I The class
characteristics ofthe Labor Party have decisively shaped important
aspects ofdomestic economic and industrial relations policy. Their
impact on foreign policy has been less direct.
Secondly, Labor has consistently, to use its own language,
sought to "serve the national interest." This has entailed efforts to
appeal electorally to all, or almost all, sections of the population.
But a longstanding Marxist analysis of nationalism, recently ex-
tended in a substantial literature on the origins and contemporary
significance of nationalism, suggests that national and class inter-
ests cannot be divorced. 12 Nations are, to use Anderson's term,
"imagined communities." Capitalist and middle classes, and intel-
lectuals associated with them, create national identities as ideolo-
gies which mobilize broad support behind projects that serve their
interests.
The creation of a federated Australian state, as opposed to the
separate colonies, is a good example. Federation served the inter-
ests of the dominant capitalist class who sought the economies of
scale of a larger domestic market created by a state presiding over
the whole continent. The greater autonomy from Britain ofthis new
state also provided local capital with more scope to pursue its
11 For a more detailed discussions of the nature of the Labor Party see Rick
Kuhn, "What a Labor Government Is," Politics 24, 2 (November 1989),
147-53 and "Labor in Power" Arena, 88 (Spring 1989), 134-43; Tom
Bramble, "Managers of Discontent: Problems of Labour Leadership," in
Rick Kuhn and Tom O'Lincoln, eds., Class and Class Conflict in Australia
(Melbourne 1996), 40-57.
12 For an overview see C. Hannan, "The Return of the National Question,"
International Socialism, 56 (Autumn 1992), 3-62; B. Anderson, Imagined
Communities (London 1983); E. Hobsbawm, Nations andNationalism Since
J780 (Cambridge 1990).
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security interests. The newly federated states maintained the con-
servative structure of bi-cameral colonial legislatures which were
extended to the federal Parliament. In its upper house, the Senate,
voters from the smallest, least economically developed States -
which therefore had the least numerous working classes - were
vastly overrepresented. The conservative nature of the new state
generated hostility to federation in radical sections of the labour
movement, while politicians and the daily press promoted nation-
alism in the form of commitment to prosperity and to the new
national institutions. 13
This is not to say that the "imagined communities" of nations
are simply illusory. Residents and citizens ofmodem nation states
do have important and real common experiences. Residents of
Australia are subject to the same state. Citizens ofAustralia gener-
ally have had the same formal rights. But nationalism privileges
individuals' membership in the national community at the expense
of other, particularly class, identities. For most of the Australian
capitalist class, national and class identity are not in conflict. State
action, by virtue of its ongoing commitment to prosperity in the
context of a capitalist economy, is geared to capitalist interests in
rapid capital accumulation. So the protection ofcapitalist property
and the promotion of profit making to secure investment and
growth against domestic and foreign challenges is intrinsic to both
capitalists' and national interests. The Labor Party's longstanding
nationalism (and, until the late 1960s, racism) therefore reveals a
preparedness to manage and promote Australian capitalism and
hence the interests of its dominant class.
Workers, on the other hand, have an interest in improved wages
and conditions which may reduce profitability. They would also
benefit from eliminating their status as appendages of capital by
abolishing capitalist property, whether they are intent on achieving
13 See R. White, Inventing Australia:. Images and Identity, 1688-1980 (Sydney
1981), for a systematic discussion of the invention of Australian national
identity and class influences on it.
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this goal at any particular time or not. These contradictory interests
of labour and capital are concealed by the illusion that all residents
or citizens are "in the same boat" and will all benefit from the
pursuit ofthe national interest.
Nationalism arguments, promoted by politicians, newspapers
and leading public figures, addressed real problems faced by the
working class and nationalist strategies found working-class adher-
ents, particularly when alternative approaches had little organized
or influential support. Competition from less well paid foreign or
local Chinese labour did put pressure on the wages of European
Australian workers. But the racist and nationalist response of
excluding "non-whites" from Australia, which had considerable
middle- and ruling-class backing, was not the only logical possibil-
ity for local workers. The Chinese Workers Union in the Melbourne
furniture industry, for example, made a donation to a fund for
striking shearers in 1890. The European Furniture Trade Union
immediately demanded, on racist grounds, that the money be
returned, offering to pay an equivalent amount. In 1892, the same
European union made no effort to support Chinese workers in the
industry striking over wage cuts against Chinese employers. In
both cases racist divisions served the interests ofbosses.14 In order
to overcome domestic and international divisions in the working
class, the radical wing of the labour movement often vehemently
opposed nationalism and racism. As early as 1887, the Australian
Socialist League opposed anti-Chinese agitation. Later organized
political expressions ofthis internationalist current were the Indus-
trial Workers of the World, from 1907, the Communist Party of
Australia (CPA) from the early 1920s until 1935, and Trotskyist
organizations, whose significancegrewfrom the late 1960s. Since its
14 Andrew Marcus, "Divided We Fall: the Chinese and the Melbourne Furniture
Trade Union, 1870-1900," Labour History, 26 (May 1974), 8-10. Also see
Ray Markey, "Populist Politics: Racism and Labor in NSW, 1880-1900," in
Ann Curthoys and Andrew Marcus, eds., Who Are Our Enemies?Racism and
the Working Class in Australia (Sydney 1978), 74, for a discussion of the
relationship between racism and nationalism.
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formation, the Labor Party has always been the dominant political
current in theAustralian working class. But ithas never beenthe only
one.
Labor Foreign Policy Before Vietnam
To World War I
British imperial authorities had cultivated racism before the inva-
sion of Australia was contemplated. They and local elites in the
new colonial settler state continued to use it to justify the expro-
priation of the Aborigines and to foster cross-class solidarity
against mythical Asian threats. I5 The early colonial Labor Parties
shared in a racist paranoia which had been the common sense of
Australian politics and the mainstream ofthe labour movement for
decades. I6 "By peddling racism more strongly than anyone else,
and by integrating it with other policies, the Labor party could hope
to appeal to a broad populist base in the electorate, given wide-
spread racial beliefs across all classes."17 So the first plank of the
Federal Party's first platform was "The cultivation ofan Australian
sentiment based upon the maintenance ofracial purity." The Party
leader, J. C. Watson, explained his reason for supporting a racist
immigration policy: "the objection I have to the mixing of these
coloured people with the people of Australia, although I admit it
may be tinged with considerations of an industrial nature, lies in
the main in the possibility of racial contamination." The newly
15 For the application of the concept of "colonial settler state" to Australia see
Tom O'Lincoln, "An imperialist Colony?" International Socialist, 10
(Melbourne August 1980),39-45.
16 V. Burgmann, "Capital and Labour: Responses to Immigration in the
Nineteenth Century," in A. Curthoys and A. Marcus, Who Are Our Enemies?
(Sydney 1978),20-34; Humphrey McQueen, A New Britannia (Ringwood
1978).
17 R. Markey, The Making ofthe Labor Party in New South Wales, 1880-1900
(Sydney 1988), 296.
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federated Commonwealth pursued a policy of"White Australia."18
A spurious dictation test was used to exclude people the authorities
felt were not white. The test was administered to such people in a
European language they did not know. At times the "non-white"
spouses ofAustralian citizens were excluded or deported. Some of
the pettiest and most vindictive applications of this racist policy
were made under the Labor Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell,
between 1945 and 1949, at a time of mass migration. 19 He was
criticized for this by the conservative opposition. The White Aus-
tralia policy was slowly liberalizedunderconservativegovernments
after 1949 and finally abolished after Gough Whitlam became Labor
PrimeMinister in 1972.
During the first decades of the twentieth century a political
consensus emerged across the main political parties, including the
ALP, that embraced not only racism but also protectionism and
industrial arbitration. The differences inside the ALP over free
trade and protection were overcome in 1907. The Party became
firmly protectionist, supporting the exclusion of foreign made
goods, principally· through the imposition of tariffs but also by
means ofquotas, which competed with local products.
Hand in hand with protectionist policies was an espousing ofthe
benefits of continuing membership in the British Empire, Austra-
lia's principal export market and the main source of overseas
capital. As the preeminent world power, Britain was also the most
desirable military ally for a small country. In tacit acknowledgment
of this situation, the mainstream of the ALP accepted Australian
involvement in the Empire as the foundation ofAustralian foreign
18 Quoted in D. Johanson, "History ofthe White Australia Policy," in K. Rivett,
ed., Immigration: Control or Colour Bar? (Melbourne 1962), 14.
19 Ibid., 26. Also see L. F. Crisp, Ben Chijley: A Political Biography (Sydney
1977), 294; G. C. Bolton, "1939-51," in Frank Crowley, A New History of
Australia (Melbourne 1976), 482. For Calwell's own explanation of his
notorious outburst, "Two Wongs Do Not Make a White," see A. Calwell,
Be Just and Fear Not (Adelaide 1978), 109.
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relations. Some members condemned imperialism and the Party
was hostile to the idea of Imperial federation (proposals for closer
political and economic integration in the British Empire around the
turn ofthe century). But Labor was far from favouring republican-
ism or withdrawal from the Empire. One of the first sustained
expositions of Laborism, published by the Australian Workers'
Union, mainstay ofthe Party in rural areas, was happy about calling
on the Imperial Parliament to change legislation to help solve the
"financial muddle" in which Australia found itself.2°
While accepting membership in the Empire as a framework,
Labor's defence policy did lay greater stress on building up local
armed forces than did the conservative parties.21 The first Federal
Labor platform called for "A Citizen Army." But this was a
position shared with many conservative figures. Both Watson, the
first Labor Prime Minister, and William Morris Hughes, who later
led the Party, were members of the Australian Naval Defence
League, the main militarist lobby in Australia. Racism was an
important element in Australian militarism particularly after Ja-
pan's victory over Russia in 1905. Andrew Fisher's 1910 Labor
Government, the first with a majority in both Houses ofParliament,
established the Australian Navy. To secure the national interest
against external threat, it introduced compulsory military training
for "men" between 12 and 26 years old, known as "boy conscrip-
tion." There was systematic resistance to the legislation, based in
more militant sections of the labour movement. "By 1915 when
161 000 youths had been trained, there had been 34 000 prosecu-
tions for failing to meet the various demands of the scheme and
7 000 detentions. ,,22
20 H. 1. Jensen, The Rising Tide (Sydney 1909), 56.
21 M. Perks, "Foreign and Defence Policies and Policy Making in the Australian
Labor Parties, 1916-30," MA thesis, Australian National University (1974),
4.
22 A. Jordens, "Conscription," in Australians: A Historical Dictionary (Sydney
1987), 88.
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On the outbreak ofWorld War I, Fisher promised "the last man
and the last shilling" for the war effort. Labor's Manifesto in the
war-time election campaign of 1914 stated, "our interests and our
very existence are bound up with those of the Empire we shall
pursue with the utmost rigour and determination every course
necessary for the defence ofthe Commonwealth and the Empire in
any and every contingency.,,23 When his successor as Prime Min-
ister, Billy Hughes, tried to extend this to conscription for overseas
service in two referenda, he faced massive opposition in the work-
ing class and union movement and, as a consequence, inside the
ALP. Both referenda were defeated. While there was an interna-
tionalist current in the broader labour movement, epitomized by the
Industrial Workers ofthe World, racist arguments were frequently
used against conscription and the War in Europe.24 Hughes ratted
on the Labor Party, taking other MPs and a minority ofthe rank and
file with him into a fanatically pro-war "National" Government
dominated by conservatives. After this split, the Party moved to the
left but its basic orientation in foreign policy did not change. The
federal party never went further than calling for a negotiated peace
in Europe.
World War I to World War 11
As opinion in the Party changed during the War, sentiments in
favour of international arbitration to avoid war emerged and Labor
subsequently supported the League of Nations. The world-wide
upsurge of class struggle during and immediately after the Great
War, which included the Russian revolution, also touched the
Australian working class and had an impact on the Labor Party,
generating greater suspicions about the imperial relationship.
Working-class internationalist arguments were voiced inside the
Party as well as pacifist, racist and nationalist sentiments. But in
23 Perks, "Foreign and Defence Policies," 4.
24 Ibid., also H. McQueen, A New Britannia (Ringwood 1970),79.
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1918, "a plank was adopted in favour of complete Australian
self-government 'as a British community.' It went no further than
that. ,,25 The ALP placed some hope in submarines and aircraft "as
a substitute for closer Imperial partnership, ,,26 though not as an
alternative to membership in the Empire. There were also nation-
alist and internationalist concerns about the detrimental conse-
quences that could follow Australian involvement in Britain's
imperialist adventures, particularly after the Chanak crisis, a mili-
tary confrontation between Britain and Turkey, ofSeptember 1922.
Conflicts in the Party led to an ill-defined foreign policy. But as the
tide of working-class militancy subsided, the Parliamentarians
reasserted their dominance and "a trend towards moderate and
electorally acceptable policies was apparent,,27 in foreign and
domestic policy.
The ALP was only in a position to shape Australian foreign
policy directly during the inter-war period when it briefly held
office from 1929 to 1931. But the Scullin Labor Government made
no effort to change Australia's foreign policy. Senior Labor Minis-
ters attended the London Conference on Naval Disarmament,
supporting the British position, and then the Imperial Conference
in 1930: "It was clear from these decisions, made when the full
force of the Depression had yet to break upon the Labor govern-
ment, that the ALP in office was little inclined to diverge to any
significant extent from the policy of its opponents.28 The Scullin
Government did end compulsory military training, mainly to save
money.29
Other retrenchment measures, at issue in heated public debate
over Australia's domestic and foreign economic policy in the early
1930s, produced a rift between the Federal organization and the
25 A. Calwell, Labor's Role in Modern Society (Melbourne 1963), 163.
26 Perks, "Foreign and Defence Policies," 279 and F. Farrell, International
Socialism and Australian Labour: The Left in Australia (Sydney 1981), 172.
27 Farrell, ibid., 169
28 Perks, "Foreign and Defence Policies," 273
29 Jordens, "Conscription."
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New South Wales Labor Party led by Jack Lang, who offered his
own plan for dealing with the Depression. Conservative economists
drafted the' 'Premiers' Plan," which was advocatedby the conserva-
tive parties and which Scullin eventually adopted. Treasurer Ted
Theodore and his dissident economist adviser R. F. Irvine, proposed
the' 'TheodorePlan."ItincludedstepslikethoseadvocatedbyKeynes
inBritain, suchas lower interestrates, highertaxationofincomefrom
interest,deficitspendinganddevaluationofthecurrency.Itsemphasis
onfiscal and monetarypoliciesas meanstoovercomecapitalistcrises
and ofreconciling the interests ofcapital and labour anticipated the
post World War 11 ideology expressed by social democratic parties
aroundtheworld.Butthehostilityoftheconservativeparties,newspa-
pers and business in general resulted in a campaignagainstTheodore
onthe basis ofhis earlier shady business dealings as a State politician
inQueensland, anddiscreditedbothhim andhisproposals.
.The tradition ofradical "Money Power" populism in the labour
movement was evident in Lang's proposals. The Money Power
perspective understood society as divided between mainly foreign
financial interests and their lackeys on the one hand and the
"people" on the other. The Lang Plan was explicitly counterposed
to the idea of expropriating capital. It proposed that Australian
governments cease paying interest to British bondholders, that
interest on domestic debt be reduced to three percent and that
Australia abandon the gold standard. Given Australia's depend-
ence on intemationalloan and export markets, such a policy could
only have resulted in lower levels of domestic income. These
dramatic implications were never seriously explored by advocates
of the Lang Plan. But Lang's verbal radicalism attracted massive
popular and especially working class support. He was able to tap
widespread bitterness towards capitalism and conservative poli-
cies. At a time when unemployment and the collapse of unionism
in many sectors meant most workers lacked the confidence or the
opportunity to express this bitterness through industrial militancy,
Lang seemed to be a popular champion who would act on behalfof
ordinary people. He reinforced his support by appealing to racist
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prejudices. The Government adopted the Premiers' Plan, which
involved savage cutbacks in Government spending, including pen-
sions and public service salaries, and the maintenance, as far as
possible, of established ties with Britain. In March 1931 the NSW
Labor Party and the federal organizationsplit. Scullinwasdefeated
in the December 1931 elections, while Lang was dismissed by the State
Governor in May 1932.30
As international tensions increased during the mid 1930s, both
Lang's separate NSW Labor Party and the Federal organization
were hostile to Australia becoming involved in overseas conflicts.
They condemned the imposition ofsanctions by the League ofNations
on Italy, after its invasion ofAbyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935. An element
in this position was Labor's large Catholic membership and the
Church's favourable attitude to Mussolini. The left in both Labor
Parties supported sanctions, on the basis of a logic most consistently
expressed by the Communist Party of Australia (CPA). The Party
developed a membership of several thousand for the fIfSt time during
the Depression. Stalinized during the early 1930s, it loyally followed
every turn in Russian foreign policy until the mid 1960s.
Out ofa concern not to generate renewed factional tensions and
despite his personal inclinations, John Curtin, the leader of a
reunited Party, and other senior Party figures did not comment on
the Spanish Civil War.31 To increase defence self-reliance, reca-
pitulating the preoccupation that led to the creation of the Austra-
lian Navy, the ALP was the strongest advocate of building up the
Australian airforce. Although the contraction of British influence
30 See P. Love's account of Money Power ideas, including the "Battle of the
Plans," Labour and the Money Power: Australian Labour Populism,
1890-1950 (Melbourne 1984) and R. Kuhn "Paradise on the Instalment Plan:
The Economic Thought of the Australian Labour Movement between the
Depression and the Long Boom," PhD Thesis, University ofSydney (1985),
22-34.
31 Farrell, International Socialism, 217. On "isolation" in the ALP during this
period see E. M. Andrews, lsolationisln and Appeasement in Australia
(Canberra 1970).
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made it less appealing as a protector and economic partner, flirta-
tion with isolationism did not entail a rejection of participation in
the British Empire which was the mainstay ofthe foreign policy of
conservative governments during the 1920s and 1930s. Neither
abandonment ofthe Empire nor an alternative alliance were realis-
tic options at any stage during the interwar period. Labor leader
John Curtin argued in 1938 that, "We believe in the British
Commonwealth of Nations far more soundly than do the honour-
able gentlemen opposite, who merely blather about the flag and the
Empire.,,32 By 1939 the Party indicated it would support Britain
should war break out.
World War 11to Vietnam
After the outbreak of World War 11, Labor in opposition quickly
shed its qualms about involvement in European wars and adopted
a position similar to that at the start of World War 1.33 A Japanese
victory in the Pacific and particularly New Guinea would have
disrupted the pattern ofAustralian trade and sources of investment
even more radically than German dominance in Europe. After a
brief period of opposition, the Party endorsed Prime Minister
Menzies' introduction of conscription for service in Australia.
Labor took office in October 1941 under Curtin, when two conser-
vative independents decided the ALP would manage the war effort
better than the disintegrating United Australia Party. Curtin's De-
cember 1941 "call to America," after Japan entered the War, was
a rhetorical expression of a profoundly pragmatic policy adjust-
ment recognising that Britain was no longer capable ofpolicing the
world in Australia's interests.34 The US Alliance has remained a
32 J. Curtin, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of
Representatives), CPD, Vo!. 157,5 October 1938,395.
33 J. M. McCarthy, "The ALP and the Anned Services: Theory and Practice,"
Labour History, 20 (November 1973), 58-67.
34 The Lyons Government had been prepared in 1938 to turn to America for
military aircraft, given the delays in obtaining them from Britain, ibid., 64.
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pillar of Australian foreign policy, under Labor and conservative
governments, ever since. In order to defend Australia after the fall
of Singapore and the annihilation ofBritish influence in southeast
Asia, Curtin also withdrew Australian forces from the Middle East
and insisted, against Churchill, that they be deployed in Australia
rather than Burma.
Unlike Hughes, Curtin, a pacifist during World War I, success-
fully introduced conscription for service outside Australia in 1943.
This was opposed by some Labor MPs, including Eddie Ward, the
most left-wing Minister of the time, and Arthur Calwell. But
disquiet was limited in the wider labour movement. The racial and
military threat to the national interest from Japan appeared much
more immediate in 1943 than 1916. And after the German invasion
of Russia in June 1941, the Communist Party was fanatically
prowar, unlike the IWW and other socialist groups during World
War I. Thanks to Labor's ties to the working class (and the
Communist Party's recent change in policy) and, in contrast to the
efforts ofits conservative predecessor, the Curtin Government was
able to coopt the leadership of the union movement into the
management of the war effort. This facilitated speed-ups, oyer-
time, pegging of wages and reduced living standards. Such meas-
ures would have been impossible under the conservatives without
dramatic increase in industrial unrest. The Government also broad-
ened the taxation base by increasing income tax and lowering its
threshold. It retained the services of administrators such as Ess-
ington Lewis, Managing Director of BHP, whom Menzies had
appointed Director-General of Munitions. Cost-plus procurement
policies guaranteed private industry's profits. As an Allied victory
drew nearer the level of industrial action started to rise again in
defiance of both Labor and Communist policy, particularly on the
coal fields. 35
35 Only 378 195 days were "lost" through industrial disputes in 1942, the level
already rose to 990 151 in 1943, though this was still a low figure. See Kuhn,
"Paradise on the Instalment Plan," 213..7.
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During and after the War, the Labor Government promoted the
development of multilateral institutions, notably the United Na-
tions, International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on
Trade and Tariffs, as multipliers of Australia's otherwise limited
influence. But the permanent Security Council members' veto
powers, whose creation ALP Foreign Minister and the first Presi-
dent of the General Assembly Bert Evatt had resisted in 1945,
undermined the effectiveness of the United Nations as such a
mechanism. The USA sabotaged the proposed regulatory comple-
ment to the GATT, the International Trade Organisation. Alliances
with Britain and the USA therefore remained Australia's main
means for influencing world events. In order to increase Australia's
international weight and to promote capital accumulation the Chi-
fley Government initiated a program ofsubsidized mass immigra-
tion, on the basis of racist selection criteria. The program was
continued under the conservative Government of Robert Menzies
after 1949. The US alliance was also the mainstay of his foreign
policy and that of later conservative governments, though they
showed a greater sentimental attachment to Britain, supporting for
example, the mother country's position in the 1956 Suez debacle.
The importance of the US Alliance to Australia was reinforced
by the postwar consolidation of the United States' superpower
status. At the same time economic ties between Australia and the
USA deepened, in terms of trade and investment, including the
activities of US based multinational corporations. While the ALP
and the conservative parties agreed on a primary foreign policy
orientation to the United States, they differed on the specifics ofthe
relationship and secondary issues. The Labor Party was often more
bellicose than the conservatives. Labor, for example, favoured a
more punitive peace agreement with Japan than the one which the
USA promoted and the Menzies Government signed. The ALP
then endorsed the 1951 ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and
United States) agreement which it regarded as a quidpro quo for
the unsatisfactory Japanese peace treaty. But Labor's aggressive
nationalism soon led to criticisms that the South East Asia Treaty
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Organisation, unlike NATO, lacked teeth and calls for more effec-
tive defence spending and the encouragement ofstrategic industry.
Foreign policy disputes enlivened the factional polarizations
inside the ALP during the early 1950s. The supporters ofthe Industrial
Groups, behind which stood the covert Catholic Social Studies Move-
ment led by Bob Santamaria, were virulently anti-communist. Between
1954 and 1956 the "Groupers" in different States split to form the
Democratic Labor Party, which by delivering its preferences to the
Liberals helped keep the ALP out of office for another decade and a
half. After the split Labor policy moved somewhat to the left. The Party
opposed, for example, the 1955 dispatch of Australian troops to fight
communists in Malaya, though this position was abandoned in 1963.
Labor demonstrated its continuing commitment to the relationship
with Britain when it accepted a 1955 announcement that British atomic
bombs would be tested in Australia.36
The ALP and Vietnam
The development ofLabor's position on the Vietnam war provides
a particularly useful case study of the Party's foreign policy tradi-
tion, its material and intellectual basis and points ofsimilarity and
difference from the policies of the conservative parties. Labor was
mainly out ofoffice during the Vietnam period, but Gough Whitlam
became the first Labor Prime Minister for 23 years, in late 1972, in
time to complete the withdrawal of Australian forces which the
conservatives had begun. Australia's experience of the Vietnam
war has also been mythologized into a triumph for the Labor tradi-
tion. In fact the Menzies Government, its conservative successors and
the Labor opposition shared fundamental assumptions about the na-
tional interest and the US Alliance. While conceived of in a somewhat
36 See B. Carter, "The Peace Movement in the 1950s," in A. Curthoys and J.
Merritt, eds., Better Dead than Red (Sydney 1986), 72.
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different way, the national interest was also the linchpin of the
positions ofthe left both inside the Party, and, in the main, outside
it. In order to understand the development of the Party's policies
on Vietnam it is necessary to examine the Australian interests at
stake in the war. Both the material advantages which derived from
participation in the war and the ideology behind Government
policy therefore need to be examined. The evolution of official
Labor policy and that ofthe Party's left can then be explored.
Why was Australia there?
The Menzies Government lied about the events leading up to the
May 1962 and April 1965 decisions to send "instructors" and then
a battalion of troops to Vietnam. In order to encourage a greater
US presence in southeast Asia in general, and to promote the
escalation ofthe War in Vietnam, the Government suggested to US
officials that it could send a battalion to Vietnam. No request was
received from the US or South Vietnamese Governments. US
officials accepted the offer. Subsequently, the Australian Ambas-
sador approached the South Vietnamese Prime Minister for a
formal request for Australian forces. This "request" was then used
to justify the operation publicly.37
Apart from superficial rhetoric about defending democracy,
some·conservatives made frank statements that it was in Australia's
national interest to involve the United States in southeast Asia and
that Australian participation in the Vietnam conflict would encour-
37 The original demonstration that the Menzies Government had lied about how
the 1965 deployment of Australian troops in Vietnam came about, is M.
Sexton, War for the Asking: Australia's Vietnam Secrets (Ringwood 1981),
41, 136-56. Additional details are available in the conservative official
history, P. Edwards and G. Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The
Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian
Conflicts, 1948-1965 (Sydney 1992),358-75.
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age this. A senior academic apologist for Government policy made
the argument very plain: "The commitment ofAustralian forces to
Vietnam does more than anything else we can do to ensure a
continued American presence in an area which is vital to our
security. ,,38 There is an important element oftruth in this, once we
understand what the national interest was. But the most popular
conservative justification for Australia's involvement in Vietnam
derived from the domestic political and economic advantages of
propagating racism (the "Yellow Peril") and anti-communism (the
"Red Hordes") neatly combined in a fear of Chinese expansion-
ism, toppling dominoes down to Darwin. So Menzies claimed that
The takeover ofSouth Vietnam would be a direct military threat to
Australia and all the countries of South and South-East Asia. It
must be seen as part ofa thrust by Communist China between the
Indian and Pacific Oceans.39
The US Alliance was allegedly an insurance policy against the
Asian/communist threat to Australia. Supporting the US in Viet-
nam was a way of renewing it. There was little serious evidence to
support this argument and it was quickly debunked by the anti-war
movement.40 It was, nevertheless, effective for some years.
Like racism, anti-communism served to bind all Australian
classes together against a common imagined foe. An element in
conservative ideology since 1917 at the latest, paranoia about an
international communist conspiracy grew with the Cold War from
the mid 1940s. It identified an external foe with internal enemies
out to destroy the Australian way of life. Anti-communism helped
38 S. Cowen, "Australia's Policy Towards Asia," in Australian Institute of
Political Science, Communism in Asia: A Threat to Australia? (Sydney
1967), 168.
39 CPD (H ofR) Vol. 45, 29 April 1965, 1061. Also CPD (H ofR) Vol. 44, 10
November 1964,2715-18 which provides a rationale for forward defence,
the SEATO and ANZUS treaties and the introduction of conscription.
40 For example, see the widely reproduced arguments of H. Levien, Vietnam:
Myth and Reality (Sydney 1967) also see University Study Group on
Vietnam, Vietnam and Australia (Sydney 1966).
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to undennine support for local "communists," understood as so-
cialists, union militants and anyone else deemed to sympathize with
them.41 The construction of a racially unified Australia and the
marginalization ofworking-class militants and dissidents, in other
words, benefited Australia's capitalist class and also justified a particu-
lar foreign policy course. But that course cannot be understood simply
in the framework of dominant ideas, it also has to be examined in
material terms.42
The Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, explained some
ofthe real interests the USA and Australia had in raising the stakes
in Vietnam:
The United States could not withdraw [from South Vietnam]
without necessarily considering the world-wide impact of such a
withdrawal on the broader strategies ofworld politics.43
This paralleled the more confidential explanation of US calcula-
tions by "Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton who
in late March [1965] assigned relative weights to various American
objectives in Vietnam": "To avoid humiliating US defeat (to our
reputation as a guarantor)," 70 per cent, "to keep SVN (and then
adjacent) territory from Chinese hands," 20 per cent and "to permit
the people of SVN enjoy a better, freer way of life," 10 per cent.44
Australian capitalists needed a growing and profitable global
private capitalist economy, capable of absorbing Australian ex-
ports, and providing both commodities not produced here, and
capital flows, to cover the typical current account deficit. This
41 R. Kuhn, "Whose Cold War?: Capitalism, Class and Economic Crisis," in
R. Summy and M. Salla, eds., Why the Cold War Ended: A Range of
Interpretations (Boulder 1995), 153-69.
42 See Jan Pettman's critique of "national identity," which does not, however,
draw attention to its important class content, "National Identity and
Security," in G. Smith and S. Kettle, eds., Threats Without Enemies:
Rethinking Australia Js Security (Sydney 1992), 53-68.
43 CPD (H ofR) Vol. 45,23 March 1965,233. Sexton, 117, misinterprets this
as an effort to exert pressure on the USA.
44 The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States
Decisionmaking in Vietnam, Vol. IV (Boston 1971),22.
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entailed both endorsement of the western side of the contest with
the Soviet Bloc and a rejection of efforts by underdeveloped
countries to radically alter their form ofintegration into the private
capitalist world. No doubt Hasluck and McNaughton regarded
these as identical. It is true that successful national liberation
movements against the United States and its allies might give
succour to the Soviet Bloc. But, more importantly and realistically
they could limit the scope for private capitalist profit-making by
imposing restrictions on trade and investment, while providing
encouragement for other similar movements.
Australia's modest economic and military capacity meant that
its governments alone could not hope to significantly shape the
international order, as opposed to that closer to home in the south-
west Pacific. The United Nations was ineffective and British power
continued to decline, particularly east of Suez, which left the USA
as the only "superpower" rival to the Soviet Union and powerful
ally for Australia. At the same time, US-Australian bilateral eco-
nomic relations grew at the expense ofAnglo-Australian relations.
Keeping in mind the fundamental qualification that the national
interest is at the same time a class interest, it is possible to agree
with the current Liberal Party leader, John Howard's comment
"that Menzies and his colleagues (and often large sections of the
Labor Party) believed it to be in Australia's interests to act in
concert with those powerful friends - and that in most cases, that
judgement was right. ,,45
In its foreign policy, as in Australia's, "The United States was
acting not out ofa desire to defend the nation against some tangible
threat to its physical welfare but because it sought to create a
controllable, responsive order elsewhere, one that would permit the
political destinies ofdistant places to evolve in a manner beneficial
45 1. Howard, "Menzies Minus the Myths," Weekend Australian, 12-13
November 1994, Books Section, 5.
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to American goals and interests far surpassing the immediate needs
of its .domestic society.,,46 As the world's largest economic and
military power, the USA was in a better position than any other
state to secure a global private capitalist order. And this preemi-
nence encouraged an (ultimately unjustified) optimism in the vi-
ability of this project. As Australian capital had an interest in
creating and sustaining a broadly similar world order to that sought
by the United States, it was a logical policy option to encourage the
USA to police the world. In this way, Australia achieved a free ride
in terms of the proportion of output devoted to arms expenditure.
Australian military expenditure was around halfthat ofthe USA, as
a proportion ofGNP, during the Vietnam War.47
Central Europe, where the two blocs directly confronted each
other in strength, was the site at which most was at stake in the Cold
War. The United States' own back yard in Latin America was its
main preoccupation as far as the underdeveloped world was con-
cerned, especially after "communism" gained its hemispherical
"toehold" in Cuba. In terms of overseas investment and trade,
shipping routes and military strategy,48 the western Pacific and
46 G. Kolko, Vietnam: Anatomy of War, 1940-1975 (London 1987), 73; The
Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose
(Boston 1969), xv, 78. Michael Hammel-Green expressed a similar view in
Australia, "although American economic interests are not directly present in
Vietnam, the war is a test of whether American military security for her
economic hegemony over the rest of the Third World can be successfully
challenged by popular revolutionary guerilla movements. Hence American
leaders" talk ofthe necessity ofshowing that "wars ofnational liberation are
bound to fail." "Vietnam: Beyond Pity," Dissent (Winter 1970),33.
47 1. Richardson, "Australian Strategic and Defence Policies," in G.
Greenwood and N. Harper, Australia in World Affairs (1974), 239. Also see
M. Teichmann, ed., "Introduction," New Directions in Australian Foreign
Policy (Ringwood 1969), 11.
48 Objectively the levels of threat to Australian territory were very low: none
of the countries in the region had an interest in armed conflict with Australia
and, even if they had, their military capacity was small. The Minister for the
Army noted in his diary in mid 1965 that "The threat to the Australian
mainland remains remote till at least 1970," quoted in Pemberton, All the
Way, 313. Other factors involved in the Government's decision to send a
battalion to Vietnam in 1965 were its concerns about the credibility of
SEATO and bolstering ANZUS, as well as Indonesia's "Confrontation" with
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southeast Asia were of much greater concern for Australian Gov-
ernments. Given this disparity, there was a clear logic behind
efforts to maintain US interest in the region. A conservative aca-
demic put his finger on this in 1963:
Attempting to pursue an independent policy, Australia has found
that the global strength of the United States has set limits within
which diplomatic manoeuvring is possible, and consequently that
one of the major tasks of Australian diplomacy has been to
collaborate with the United States and to influence, perhaps
attempt to orient, American policy in our own area that is often of
peripheral interest to Washington.49
And the best study of the origins of Australia's involvement in
Vietnam observes that "Australia's strategic and economic inter-
ests demanded that Western hegemony be maintained in" southeast
Asia.50 Australian policy makers embraced an ideology ofnational
defence most of whose racist and anti-communist premises had
little in common with reality. But that ideology justified a very
broad international economic and strategic policy which could
accord with the interests ofthe Australian capitalist class. Far from
being a puppet of the USA, the Australian Government's position
"was to the Right ofthe US over Vietnam, seeking skilfully to use
its troop commitment to force an even larger commitment by the
us. ,,51 What Richard Leaver has called "the counter-cyclical
Malaysia in northern Borneo, essentially as a diversion from domestic
tensions. It seems that calculations about Indonesian policy were very
important in the decision to introduce conscription in 1964.
49 N. Harper, "Australia and the United States, with Special Reference to
South-East Asia," in G. Greenwood and N. Harper, 169.
50 G. Pemberton, All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam (Sydney 1987),333.
51 G. Clark, "The Vietnam Debate Revisited," Quadrant, 33, 10 (October
1989), 10. Also see Pemberton, All the Way, 267-8. After 1966 when "the
primary objective [of embroiling the USA in the region] had been achieved
... America did not find much enthusiasm from their [Australian] ally after
1966 to increase its contribution to the common effort in Vietnam." Ibid.,
319.
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pattern in relations between the ANZUS ~llies, ,,52 not only dem-
onstrates the poverty of approaches which emphasize Australian
dependence on the USA but also the existence ofdistinct Australian
interests which Australian governments have pursued.
The Labor Party and the War
Analyses ofwhy Australia was in Vietnam varied within a narrow
range, though there were more diverse proposals for what to do
about it. There was a broad consensus that included not only the
conservative parties and the ALP but also the CPA and the pro-
Beijing Communist Party of Australia-Marxist Leninist (CPA-
ML) that Australian involvement in Vietnam should be judged on
the basis ofthe national interest. The Government and the right and
centre of the Labor Party agreed that maintaining the US Alliance
was important for Australia. They differed over whether conduct-
ing the war in Vietnam actually benefited Australia (and the USA).
Jim Cairns, a member of the ALP's shadow cabinet and the most
prominent left Labor opponent ofthe War, agreed with much ofthe
Labor right that participation in the War was not in Australia's
interest. But, he advocated a foreign policy less reliant on relations
with the USA. The main forces further left regarded both the War
and the Alliance as a betrayal ofAustralia and the Government as
essentially a puppet ofthe United States.
The ALP's contradictory location between labour and capital
(on the one hand its commitment to the management ofAustralian
capitalism and parliamentarism, on the other its connections with
the working class) was an important factor that, along with the
domestic and international political situations, shaped the Party's
understanding of developments in Vietnam and stance on the war.
52 R. Leaver, "Patterns ofDependence in Post-war Australian Foreign Policy,"
Australian Political Studies Association Conference, University of NSW,
24-7 September 1989.
112 left history
The ALP, as much as the conservative parties, recognized the logic
ofcapitalist Australia's position in the world. Thus the Parliamen-
tary Labor Party did not oppose decisions to send Australian
"instructors" to Vietnam in 1962 and 1964, or troops to North
Borneo, to support Malaysia against Indonesia, in 1963. The Fed-
eral Executive and Party Conference in 1963 approved (though
with strong opposition from the left) the establishment ofa US base
at Northwest Cape.53
Except on the left of the Party, the Labor conception ofAustra-
lia's place in the world rested on the same foundations as that ofthe
conservatives: Australia was an independent member of the com-
munity ofstates, capable, without radical social changes, ofpursu-
ing its people's interests. The idea of "imperialism" was inimical
to such a perspective. Mainstream Labor tended, therefore, to
regard the Vietnam War as essentially a civil war into which
Australia and the USA had foolishly strayed.54 Members of the
Party's left also saw the conflict simply as a civil war.55
The precise balance between using military force and other
means in securing common US/Australian international goals and
the extent of the USA's capacity to act as a global cop were
contentious matters in US administrations and in local debate over
Australia's involvement in Vietnam.56 The initial difference be-
53 K. Beazley, "Federal Labor and the Vietnam Commitment," in P. King, ed.,
Australia's Vietnam (Sydney 1983), 41-2; Edwards, Crises and
Commitment, 348, 278.
54 A. Calwell, CPD (H ofR) Vol. 46,4 May 1965, 1102-7. Also see T. Uren,
a prominent member ofthe left from NSW, CPD (H ofR) Vol. 45, 25 March
1965, 347, CPD (H ofR) Vol. 50, 22 March 1966, 432, 435; and even as late
as 1968, CPD (H of R) Vol. 58, 28 March 1968, 621.
55 See T. Uren, CPD (H ofR) Vol. 45, 25 March 1965,347; Vol. 47, 19 August
1965,249-50; Vol. 50,22 March 1966,432; Vol. 58, 28 March 1968,621.
56 In 1964 there was some scepticism about the capacity ofthe United States to
win the war at high levels of the Australian Department of External Affairs,
D. Jenkins, "1964: We Plan Bomb Attack on Indonesia," Sydney Morning
Herald, 2 January 1995, 1, drawing on recently released Cabinet documents.
The consetvative French Government did not believe that the communists
could be defeated in South Vietnam, Pemberton, Crises and Commitments,
195.
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tween the Government and Opposition was on how to secure the
US alliance and US willingness to intervene in the region. They
agreed that these were desirable goals. Both thought US interven-
tion in Vietnam was legitimate. The Menzies Government thought
a more substantial US involvement was desirable and could be
secured by sending Australian troops. Conscription was necessary
for this. The ALP mainstream was more inclined to believe that
verbal encouragement and cheaper practical steps than sending
Australian troops to Vietnam would be enough to promote US
commitment to the region. These steps, cheaper than maintaining
troops in the field, included endorsement for the bombing ofNorth
Vietnam in early 1965, the establishment of US bases in Australia
and a supportive but not uncritical attitude to US foreign policy.
Arthur Calwell was ALP leader from 1960 until early 1967.
While not of the Labor left, he was not associated with the right
either. He opposed conscription, announced in November 1964.
Calwell's opposition to conscription dated back to World War I and
reflected the widespread hostility in the labour movement then and
subsequently to compulsory service, as threatening not only work-
ers' physical safety but also undermining their position on the
labour market. 57 But these attitudes were tempered by Labor's
commitment to managing capitalism. The Curtin Government, for
example, had introduced conscription for overseas service in 1943
with the support of the extra-parliamentary Party (though Calwell,
not yet a Minister, had opposed this).
Calwell criticized the dispatch of troops to Vietnam in 1965,
arguing that Menzies and the US Government had overestimated
57 On Calwell's opposition to conscription see G. LangleY,A Decade ofDissent
(Melbourne 1992), 69; A. Calwell, Calwell: Be Just and Fear Not
(Melbourne 1978), 35, 54 and A. Calwell, Labor's Role in Modern Society
(Melbourne 1963), 164.
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the possibility of a military solution to the Vietnam "problem. ,,58
He maintained that it would be more effective to combat commu-
nism by improving the lives of the South Vietnamese people and
advocated United Nations involvement to resolve the dispute. As a
Labor stalwart with a knowledge of the union movement, he also
had some feel for the capacity of ordinary people, if organized, to
resist authority. This and his early sympathy for the Irish inde-
pendence struggle were a basis for grasping the problems the USA
would face in Vietnam: it was not in the interests of the USA or
Australia for the US to remain involved in an unwinnable war.
Similarly, he recognized that militancy and Communism were not
the same thing, though he can hardly be regarded as being soft on
Communism (he was made a Papal Knight in 1963!). Calwell was
predisposed to his position on Vietnam, with its emphasis on
compromize andthe UN as arbiter, by asocial democratic preference
for pursuing domestic political and economic stability through collabo-
ration amongst the state, bosses and unions. This had been a dominant
feature of the successful management of industrial relations on terms
favourable for capital by the Curtin and Chifley Governments. While
Labor's position on the Vietnam War had deep roots, there were o~her
advocates of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam: amongst Australian
employers, the conservative French President de Gaulle and even
sections of the US bureaucracy.
During the May 1965 parliamentary debate on the commitment
of Australian troops to Vietnam, Calwell highlighted the basis of
his positions on the war, "All our words, all our policies, all our
actions must be judged ultimately by this one crucial test: What best
58 Kolko identifies the hubris of imperial states in their overconfidence in their
own power. In Vietnam, "America, locked into its mission to control the
broad contours of the world's political and socioeconomic development, had
set for itself inherently unobtainable political objectives." "Despite
America's many real successes in imposing its hegemony elsewhere,
Vietnam exposed the ultimate constraints on its power in the modern era: its
internal tensions, the contradictions between overinvolvement in one nation
and its interests and ambitions elsewhere, and its material limits." Kolko,
Vietnam, 545, 547.
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promotes our national security, what best guarantees our national
survival?,,59 And he regarded the us Alliance as being in the
national interest. The problem was that the conservatives were too
supine in their attitude to the United States and the Johnson
Administration was mistaken in its Vietnam policies. The Labor
leader was capable of expressing this in populist rhetoric when it
suited him, denouncing the Government's failure "to define and
implement a clear defence and foreign policy that has now placed it
in the relation of a client, rather than the ally of our great and
powerful friends. ,,60 But one ofhis concerns was to prevent Wash-
ington from being embarrassed in Vietnam,61 because he regarded
Australia as an independent power whose interests included close
relations with the USA. Unfortunately, he believed, Menzies was
not doing a good job in realising this basic and common goal.
The debate between Labor and the conservatives over Austra-
lia's defence capacity was linked to that over the management of
the US Alliance. Both accepted the need for strong armed forces.
Until the mid 1960s, Labor insisted that current levels of defence
spending were inadequate. In practice, conservative governments
offset military outlays against greater emphasis on the Alliance.
59 CPD (H ofR) Vol. 46,4 May 1965, 1102. For a very clear expression ofhis
support for the US Alliance, which did not alter after Australian troops were
committed, and preparedness to condone the dispatch of additional
Australian "instructors" to Vietnam in June 1964 see A. Calwell, The
Challenge Before Us: Australian Labor Party (Canberra 1964), 9, 11.
60 CPD (H ofR) Vol. 38,2 April 1963, 266.
61 "We want the American presence, strong and powerful, in Asia and the
Pacific. It is precisely because we do not want America to be humiliated,
because we want America to be in a position to negotiate from strength, that
we are concerned about the danger ofher present course" CPD (H ofR) Vol.
45,23 March 1965,241; CPD (H ofR) 46,29 April 1965, 1107. Also Allan
Fraser CPD (H ofR) Vo!. 47, 18 August 1965, 206. For similar views outside
Parliament see, for example, University Study Group, Vietnam andAustralia,
whose proposals for resolving the Indochinese problem were very similar to
Labor's in 1966, 134. "It is not a question of the US imperialists telling
Whitlam et at to be a counterrevolutionary; rather it is a question ofWhitlam
et at telling the imperialists how to be more effective at it. There is no
disagreement over ends, only over means," H. McQueen, "Living OffAsia,"
Arena, 26 (1971),15.
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Menzies' fifteen years in office, Calwell argued in early 1965,
"have left Australia weak and virtually defenceless. ,,62 Labor
consistently argued that improved wages in the army, instead of
conscription, were a better means to maintain Australia's defence
capacity.63
The conflict between the Government and Opposition over
Vietnam amounted to a coded (even to the participants) debate over
the most effective means of maintaining a stable world capitalist
order dominated by the USA, in the face ofrevolutionary national-
ist movements in underdeveloped countries. But, as Calwell stated,
on three great issues, there [was] agreement between the two
parties. These issues [were]: The American alliance, opposition to
Communism, and the common determination to keep Australia
safe and inviolable.64
The Government favoured confrontation and military means of
achieving foreign policy objectives. The ALP advocated coopta-
tion. As a later Labor Foreign Minister put it,
The Australian desire to see the United States actively engaged in
the security of South-East Asia was more understandable. Here
the problem lay not in the objective but in a failure to appreciate
that the US strategy in Vietnam would not succeed.65
This was a position advanced by the External Affairs Depart-
ment in 1964.66 Subsequent events demonstrated that overwhelm-
62 CPD H ofR Vol. 45, 23 March 1965. Also see A. Calwell, Labor's Policy:
Blue Print for a Government (Melbourne 1961), 21, where he promises
stronger anned forces and a maintenance ofthe level ofmilitary expenditure
established by the Liberals.
63 Richardson, "Australian Strategic and Defence Policies," 262. A. Calwell,
CPD (H ofR) Vol. 44, November 1964,2923-4, makes this point and calls
for the development of "defence" industries.
64 A. Calwell, CPD (H ofR) VoI. 45, 23 March 1965,242.
65 G. Evans and B. Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations (Melbourne 1991),
204. The Communist Party drew attention to the common assumptions of
Government and Opposition at the time, L. Aarons, "Menzies' Un~eclared
War," COlnmunist Review (June 1965), 130-1.
66 Jenkins, "1964."
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ing superiority in weaponry is not a guarantee against defeat. But
Calwell's alternative strategy for defeating or neutralising Commu-
nism in South Vietnam which the peak union body, the Australian
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), and, initially, his more conser-
vative deputy Whitlam shared67 was utopian. The prospects ofthe
USA, let alone Australia, embarking on a massive aid program to
improve Vietnamese living standards while the Communists had
control of the North and significant support in the South were
minimal. With both the USA and USSR able to veto decisions, the
UN was a nullity when the superpowers were in conflict. A
"neutral" government with NLF participation could have been
only temporary or superficial.
Although he was not systematically on the left of the Party,
Calwell's opposition to conscription and preparedness to support
extraparliamentary activity against Australian involvement in Vi-
etnam received backing from the Labor left.68 The issue ofVietnam
was a factor in a deepening polarization insidethe ALP as Whitlam
pursued his leadership ambitions. The Party's treatment ofthe question
cannot be separated from factional and electoral concerns. Unlike
Calwell, Whitlam had a middle-class background, no experience ofthe
union movement and was frrmly on the right wing of the Party.
Whitlam was sceptical ofmass involvement in politics, arguing in 1969
that "I am convinced that no demonstration helps to end conscription
or to end the war. I am convinced they are counter-productive. ,,69 The
Party had not earliercalled for unilateral Australian withdrawal from
Vietnam, but in May 1966 the Parliamentary Labor Party endorsed
Calwell'scommitmentthataLaborGovernmentwouldpullconscripts
67 See E. G. Whitlam, Australia-Base or Bridge? Evatt Memorial Lecture
(Sydney 1966),7-9
68 See, for example Socialist and Industrial Labor (March 1966), 1; (June
1966), 1; (February 1967), 3. Calwell was particularly enthusiastic about
demonstrations against South Vietnamese Prime Minister Ky during his visit
to Australia in January 1967.
69 CPD (H ofR) Vol. 63,27 May 1969,2247. Also see Murphy, Harvest of
Fear, 252.
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out "without delay" and regular forces "as soon as possible. ,,70
Shortly before the November 1966 Federal elections, the divisions
in the Party deepened. A very sympathetic study concluded that
Whitlam "was not convinced that the Americans would lose the
war; he believed that at least a compromise settlement could be
achieved, and worried that insufficient pressure was being placed
on the Americans for a negotiated settlement. ,,71 Calwell advo-
cated the immediate withdrawal of conscripts, while there would
be consultation about the process ofbringing regular troops home.
The rivals agreed, nevertheless, on the importance of the US
Alliance and Calwell did not support unilateral American with-
drawal.
After a severe defeat in the elections, Whitlam took over as
leader ofthe ALP and pulled the Party to the right on foreign policy.
Vietnam was now clearly a test case for US global power and both
the election and opinion polls indicated Australian involvement in
the war was popular. Whitlam affirmed that "It is not the American
Alliance itselfwhich has reduced Australia to a status ofdiplomatic
and defence dependence.' It is the Government's interpretation of
the Alliance.,,72 His right wing supporter Kim Beazley (senior)
defended the purity ofUS motives in Vietnam against accusations
of imperialist behaviour.73 The 1967 Federal Conference watered
down the Party's position. The resolution on Vietnam expressed
general opposition to the continuation of the war and Australian
involvement in it, but there was no call for the immediate with-
drawal ofAustralian conscripts. Australian participation, it stated,
should end only after an ALP Government had failed to persuade
"our allies" to stop bombing North Vietnam, negotiate with the
National Liberation Front and to "transform operations in South
70 M. Saunders, "The ALP's Response to the Anti-Vietnam War Movement:
1965-73," Labour History, 44 (May 1983),79.
71 Beazley, "Federal Labor and the Vietnam Commitment," 51.
72 E. G. Whitlam, Beyond Vietnam: Australia's Regional Responsibility
(Melbourne 1968), 22.
73 CPD (H ofR) Vot. 50,29 March 1966,717.
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Vietnam into holding operations.,,74 Much of the Party's left was
complicit in this position.75
Labor's policy on the war only began to become more forthright
again when this became electorally expedient. The Tet Offensive in
February 1968 demonstrated the fragility of the situation in South
Vietnam and the mood in Australia and the United States began to
shift. But it was over a year before ALP policy changed. In June
1969 the first withdrawal of US forces was announced. In July
Nixon enunciated his "Guam Doctrine," a rationale for pursuing
US foreign policy goals by means other than the deployment of
troops. The Federal Labor Conference in July formally hardened
ALP policy, against Whitlam's position that withdrawal ofAustra-
lian forces should occur after a united Vietnam had taken responsi-
bility for affairs in Phuoc Tuy Province which they were attempting
to occupy.76 In August an opinion poll indicated that for the first
time a majority ofAustralians was opposed to involvement in the
War. In October Whitlam promised the troops would be brought
home by June 1970 ifLabor won the 1969 elections.
The scale and militancy ofthe anti-war movement also increased
in response to a shift in the political climate and the rising level of
working class self-confidence. In 1969 these produced a general
strike to free Tramways Union Secretary Clarrie O'Shea and
destroyed the ability of the Arbitration Court to impose fines on
unions. When seamen had earlier taken action over staffing the
military supply ships Boonaroo and Jeparit there had been little
support in the wider union movement. The November 1969 ban by
rank and file members of the Waterside Workers Federation
(WWF) on the Jeparit, in defiance ofWWF and ACTU policy had
a much wider, positive impact. And 300 union officials from 32
unions called on National Servicemen to lay down their arms in
74 Whitlam, Beyond Vietnam, 19.
75 So, for example, Bob Gould was expelled from the NSW left Steering
Committee faction for moving for a return to the policy under Calwell at the
1967 State ALP Conference, Langley, A Decade ofDissent, 39.
76 Socialist and Industrial Labor (August 1969), 1.
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Vietnam in Fitzroy Town Hall in mid-December 1969, a much
more radical position than any advocated by the Communist Party.
It was only in 1971 that the Labor Party decided it would repeal the
National Service Act, the legislation for conscription, and "annul
its penal consequences" once it took office.
The ALP was better placed than the conservatives to adjust to the
new situation in which US administrations recognized that a new
approach to Vietnam was necessary to maintain the United States'
international influence. But by the end of 1971, the conservative
McMahon Government had cut its losses and pulled the bulk of
Australian troops out ofVietnam. At this stage, "The political aims
and sympathies ofALP leader Whitlam, so far as South-East Asia
was concerned, were indistinguishable from those of the govern-
ment, though this was not true of the party's left wing. ,,77 Ulti-
mately, Whitlam's critique of Australian policy in Vietnam, like
Calwell's, was an internal one, accepting the same conceptual
framework as the Government: that Australia was capable of
pursuing its national interests in foreign policy and that close
Australian-United States relations were consonant with those inter-
ests.
The Lahor left
Jim Cairns, a Member ofthe House ofRepresentatives (MHR), was
the preeminent opponent of Australia's involvement in Vietnam.
His views are therefore worth examining at some length as the most
visible alternative to Whitlam's position in the ALP from 1967.
Cairns made it clear that the conservative parties, Liberal, Country
and Democratic Labor, used anti-communism as a weapon against
Labor. The United States and its allies were not resisting Chinese
expansionism and Communist aspirations for world domination in
Vietnam.
77 Richardson, "Australian Strategic and Defence Policies," 262.
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Cairns recognized that there were concrete reasons why ordi-
nary people might support Communists. While expressing his
distaste for Communist dogmatism and commitment to revolution,
he recognized that they gained support in Australian trade unions
because "most Communist union officials have proved efficient ...
for ideological reasons, they are often keen to promote strikes and
other militant action, but it is also true that there is often a strong
practical case for militant action, a case that is understood and
supported by many other union members." Similarly, support for
Communism in Vietnam grew out ofthe role ofthe Viet Minh and
National Liberation Front in resisting foreign domination and
COITUpt regimes, that is, in leading an essentially nationalist move-
ment. There was no military solution to the Vietnam War. Austra-
lia, it was argued, should be offering aid and support for economic
progress. And, "Ifaid is to be effective in preventing capture ofthe
revolutionary forces by extremists, then we will have to recognize
that men who will be described as 'nationalists,' 'socialists,' or
even by some people as 'Communists,' will have to come to the
top. ,,78 Cairns' political activity was directed against US policy in
Vietnam. An "alternative" policy should "accept, in general the
national revolutionary changes as they occur" and "support and
encourage the most liberal and democratic ofthose involved much
more than oppose those called communists or leftists. ,,79
His starting point in explaining why Australia was involved in
Vietnam was Australian nationalism. His argument revolved
around the mistaken ideas and outdated attitudes on the conserva-
tive side ofpolitics:
Our failure to achieve a distinctive Australian outlook is prevent-
ing us from solving our Australian problems. The basic assump-
tion ofour "defence policy," for instance, is that we cannot solve
our military problems: that we must depend on "powerful
friends" Granted the assumption, it follows that we should never
78 1. Cairns, Living with Asia (Melbourne 1965), 174,41,97.
79 J. Cairns, Economics and Foreign Policy (January 1966),28.
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displease our "powerful friends" or they will never come to our
aid.
This analysis amounted to the identification ofa "cultural cringe"
at the level of foreign policy, because "we are ruled by classes of
people whose connections with England and the United States are
tenuous enough, but whose value-judgements are conventionally
subservient to England and the United States." Cairns did not link
this account to his discussion ofAustralia's economic problems in
terms of "the concentration of power in the hands of fewer and
fewer large 'monopolistic' companies," while "much ofthis power
is being rapidly transferred outside Australia. ,,80 In other words his
critique of Australian (and US) foreign policy was moral and
cultural. It did not identify a relationship between domestic class
structure, economic interests and imperialism.8I This dissociation
facilitated an ambiguous attitude to the US Alliance, critical of
80 Ibid., 111, 127, 115. Also see J. Cairns, The Eagle and the Lotus: Western
Intervention in Vietnam, J847-J97J (Melbourne 1971), ix, xi. The "cultural
cringe" refers to the assumption that things British (or European and
American) are superior to their home grown Australian equivalents.
81 See The Eagle and the Lotus, 75, 77,230. Cairns can envisage Australia and
the United States co-operating to play a positive role after the War through
"a reduction in the military aspects of that co-operation and an increase in
all the elements that go to make up progress in South East Asia." When Cairns
very briefly related imperialism to economics in this book, it was to a transient
"banana republic phase of American capitalism," xii, 239. In the earlier
Economics and Foreign Policy a similar down playing ofeconomic interests
was apparent. Such factors were less important than the "overall power
struggle," while US foreign policy "can best be understood ifwe think of it
as being psychologically detennined," 12, 23. For a critique of Cairns's
position, seeK. Rowley "Bob Hawke: Capital for Labor?" Arena, 25 (1971),
14; McQueen "Living Off Asia" 19-20. In her defence of Cairns against
McQueen, G. Summy confirms the weakness of Cairns's conception of
imperialism. She also identifies the problem with his idealist approach to
socialist strategy (which reflects the weight he gives to mistaken ideas in
explaining the world), "Cairns Reassessed: A Critique ofMcQueen" Arena,
26 (1971), 53, 61.
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overdependence on the US, but assuming common interests.82 It
also reflected his labourist belief that it was possible and desirable
to reconcile class conflicts in the national interest.83
Cairns' far from radical analysis of the Australia's place in the
world and involvement in Vietnam was matched by his political
stance. Not only did he comply with Labor' s official policies on the
War, he also drafted the amendment which watered down the
Party's position on Vietnam at the 1967 Federal Party Confer-
ence.
84 At a left wing Conference in 1968 he argued that "Austra-
lian influence should primarily be used to end the war, and it could
be significant in ending the war Withdrawal offorces should come
if it appears that Australian efforts to end the war were no longer
likely to be effective. ,,85
The Moratorium Campaign in 1970 and 1971 was an expression
of more widespread opposition to the war. Cairns became the
campaign's most prominent figure and demanded that Australian
forces be brought home immediately. This did not distinguish his
position from Whitlam's. His encouragement of mass political
activity did.86 Only in Victoria, where the Labor left's influence
was greatest, was the ALP to whole-heartedly support the Morato-
rium Campaign, even after Whitlam had decided that rapid with-
82 J. Cairns CPD(HofR) Vo!. 44, 17 November 1964 3097-8; Living with Asia,
99-100; "Foreign Policy after Vietnam" in Association for International
Co-operation and Disannament, The Asian Revolution and Australia
(Sydney 1969), 182-183. Cairns was not alone on the Labor left in this regard,
I. Lasry, President of the Brighton (Victoria) ALP Branch maintained in
Socialist andIndustrial Labor (July 1967),6 "that many ofthose who oppose
the Vietnam war are utterly convinced that they are the most sincerely
pro-American of all Austalian citizens."
83 See K. Rowley, "Dr Cairns on Tariffs: Planning, Imperialism and
Socialism," Farrago, 29 (July 1971),4.
84 T. Uren, Straight Left (Sydney 1994), 189. Also P. Ormonde, A Foolish
Passionate Man (Ringwood 1981), 86, 90. He did not, however, favour the
dilution of the Party's opposition to conscription.
85 Cairns, "Foreign Policy after Vietnam," 183.
86 Ormonde, A Foolish Passionate Man, 126.
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drawal was an electoral winner.87 As a consequence, the movement
was largest in that State.
Only to the left ofCaims were there explanations ofAustralia's
involvement in Vietnam which were really distinct, in their basic
assumptions, from those of the conservatives (and the mainstream
ofthe Labor Party). Most ofthese left wing accounts ofAustralia's
place in the world were influenced by the Stalinist heritage of
Australian communism, with its populist analysis of Australian
capitalism. They did not regard Australia as an independent, though
small, state pursuing its own interests. Sections of the ALP left
influenced by the Communist Party's analysis, the ePA itself, CPA
(ML) and other currents especially in the student left, saw Govern-
ment policy as a betrayal of the national interest. This policy was
seen as a result ofdirect pressure from the US Government and/or
the influence ofUS corporations and Australian monopolies allied
with US economic interests. Because its touchstone in foreign
policy was the "national interest" and it regarded local monopolies
as subservient to the USA, this populist radicalism could not
identify an independent imperialism on behalf ofAustralian inter-
ests. Cairns's idealism had allowed him to regard Australian gov-
ernments as capable ofpursuing their own policies (even if these,
under the Liberals, expressed a cultural deference). The dominant
left approach did link foreign policy to material interests but had the
implausible corollary ofregarding conservative Australian govern-
ments as mere pawns ofthe United States.
The more systematic nature ofCommunist theory and consider-
able support for the ePA in the union movement gave it an
intellectual influence in the broader labour movement including the
ALP. In order to secure Australia's independence, the epA sought
an alliance with the Labor Party, or at least its left wing. This was
part ofa strategy for winning broad support from workers, farmers,
small and even middle-sized business interests against the monop-
87 M. Saunders, "The Vietnam Moratorium Movement in Australia: 1969-73,"
PhD Thesis, Flinders University (1977).
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olists, "the sixty families who owned Australia" and their govern-
ment. So, while critical ofWhitlam and the right ofthe Labor Party,
Communists tended not to offer an analysis of the problems with
the ALP as a whole. The CPA's positions were tailored to accom-
modate allies in the ALP and, in the tradition of the peace move-
ment of the 1950s, amongst "progressive" intellectuals and
ministers of religion. There was a significant element inside the
Labor left (including a few secret Communist Party members)88
that took its lead from the Communist Party and they worked
together in the largest peace organizationsinSydneyandMelbourne,
the Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament
(AICD)andtheCongressforInternationaICo-operationandDisarma-
ment (CICD). So there was an element of feedback braking the
emergence of more radical positions in the Labor left. The CPA
accommodated its positiontotheLabor leftwhile influential sections
ofthe Labor left took their cue from the CPA. Rather than organising
around the demands to end conscription and bring Australian troops
homeimmediately,particularlyafterLabor' selectoraldefeatin 1966,
the CPA called for an end to US bombing of North Vietnam and
negotiations, summed up in the slogan "Stop the Bombing, Negoti-
ate! "; thatwasuntil thepoliticalclimateshifteddramaticallytotheleft
in 1968. And while the CPA rejected the US Alliance, for the sake of
unity ittendedto playthis downas an issue for theantiwarmovement.
Expressing ideas dominant on the left inside and outside the
ALP, Tom Uren, a federal Labor politician, stressed (in rather
88 There is, as one would expect, little written evidence of this, but for CPA
members in the Labor Party in the late 1930s and 1940s see R. Milliss,
Serpent's Tooth (Ringwood 1984), 114-5, 120 and for the 1950s see D.
Freney, A Map 0/Days: Life on the Left (Melbourne 1991) 72, 82, 92. In the
union movement Communists and sections of the Labor left worked very
closely together in some unions, while Communist led unions sent delegates
to State Labor Party Conferences. Labor Clubs at a number of Australian
universities and the Australian Student Labor Federation provided a bridge
between left Labor and Communist students during the 1950s and into the
1960s, see Ann Curthoys, in Langley, A Decade o/Dissent, 13, 30.
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vague terms) the alleged link between foreign ownership and
control ofAustralian industry and involvement in Vietnam.89 At the
third Moratorium rally in 1971, Labor Senate leader Murphy said
"We are involved because the US Government decided we should
be involved. ,,90 Uren did not, however, stray far from official Party
policy on the Vietnam conflict. In 1966 he said "we do not support
the proposal that American forces and installations should be
withdrawn from South Vietnam before peace talks commence.,,91
He also played a pivotal role in tempering the militancy of the
Sydney demonstration against South Vietnamese Prime Minister
Ky in early 1967.92 After the Tet Offensive Uren still did not go
beyond advocating the moderate official position. The slogans he
recommended were
Stop the bombing now. Recognize the National Liberation Front.
Achieve a holding position so we can have a negotiated peace in
Vietnam. It may be a long drawn out war, but this would be a
de-escalation ofthe war.93
From 1969 when Whitlam changed the ALP's position, the
anti-war movement and its Labor left component grew more radi-
cal, demanding the immediate withdrawal of troops. But Commu-
nists and their Labor left allies continued to restrain the
movement's slogans and tactics. In Brisbane they physically pre-
vented a prominent militant from speaking at a rally. The Commu-
nist Party opposed US imperialism, but the CPA and Labor left
were still not keen on the Moratorium adopting "anti-imperialist"
slogans. Even the more radical aims of the third Moratorium
mobilizationof30 June 1971 did not raise the issue of imperialism by
making links between the structure ofAustralian (or US) society and
foreign policy or the US Alliance. This approach was justified in .
89 CPD (H ofR) Vo!. 50,22 March 1966,432,435.
90 Sydney Morning Herald, 1 July 1971,2.
91 T. Uren, CPD (H ofR) Vo!. 50, 22 March 1966,435.
92 Uren, Straight Left, 188.
93 CPD (H ofR) Vo!. 58,28 March 1968,623.
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terms of the dangers of "excluding" people by going beyond the
questions offoreign troops inVietnamand conscription.94 There was
very widespread hostility to the War. So it seems that the Communist
and Labor left feared that the movement would have been weakened if
it fonnally called for an end to the US Alliance, and thus drawn
attention to the imperialist nature ofthe war, were exaggerated.95
Labor's foreign policy on Vietnam is not an illustration of the
triumph of principles, but of a profound pragmatism rooted in the
Party's material constitution. There were dramatic shifts in the
ALP's position on the Vietnam war between 1965 and 1972. These
were due to factional, local political and international develop-
ments, in the context of the overall framework of the ALP's
ongoing commitment to the "Australian national interest" and
hence the US Alliance.
After Vietnam
On taking office in December 1972, Whitlam ended conscription.
But his Government increased the size of the regular army.96
Australian foreign policy under Labor did not undergo a radical
change of direction. The shift from "forward" to "continental"
conceptions ofdefence policy began before Labor took office and,
like the reduced emphasis on the US Alliance, was a consequence
94 Aarons, CPA National Secretary, "Anti-war Perspectives: A Communist
View," Australian Left Review (March 1971),25-6.
95 This was the Maoist position at the 19 July 1970 Vietnam Moratorium
Campaign sponsors' meeting. See Saunders, "The Vietnam Moratorium
Movement in Australia," 169. The tone of "anti-imperialist" material could
be just as reasoned as that presenting more moderate explanations and
demands, see "What's So Special About Vietnam," a leaflet produced by
"an alliance of radical student and worker groups," [April 1970], Riley
Collection, National Library of Australia, "Vietnam Moratorium South
Australia. "
96 R. O'Neill, "Defence Policy," in W. 1. Hudson, ed., Australia in World
Affairs, 1971-1975 (Sydney 1980),12.
128 left history
of the USA's defeat in Vietnam and subsequent reluctance to
become directly involved in military conflicts - the "Vietnam
Syndrome." Whitlam formally recognized China, to which Aus-
tralia had been selling wheat, steel and other commodities for
decades (despite US disapproval). This policy, together with a
greater emphasis on relations with southeast Asian countries, was
part of a wider effort to renovate Australian capitalism both inter-
nally and in its articulations with the world economy.97
While the conservatives had started to dismantle the White
Australia policy during the 1960s, Labor consummated this proc-
ess. Papua-New Guinea became independent but Australian aid
and business activity continued to be crucial for the new state's
political viability. There may have been paranoia in the CIA about
the Whitlam Government, but this reflected neither an inclination
on Whitlam's part to abandon the US Alliance in general nor a
desire to make any significant changes in military and intelligence
cooperation.98 The Whitlam Government presided over the transi-
tion from Australian colonialism to neo-colonialism in New
Guinea, which has remained dependent on Australian financial aid
since its independence. Whitlam also established the framework for
Australia's policy on East Timor. As one researcher puts it, "In
meetings with then Prime Minister Whitlam in 1974 and 1975, the
Indonesian government gained the impression that the Australian
government understood Indonesia's position and would not oppose
East Timor's integration into Indonesia, notwithstanding Austra-
lia's concerns that the rights of the Timorese should be re-
spected.,,99 This "impression" proved correct. The conservative
Fraser Government formally recognized the annexation of East
97 On the program of "technocratic laborism" see Rowley, "Dr Cairns on
Tariffs," and R. Catley and B. McFarlane, From Tweedledum to Tweedledee,
(Sydney 1974).
98 S. Albinski, Australian External Policy Under Labor (Brisbane 1977),
249-51, 257-68.
99 S. Sherlock, "'A pebble in Indonesia's Shoe': recent developments in East
Timor," Department of the Parliamentary Library Research Paper No. 8
(Canberra 1995),21.
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Timor by Indonesia in 1978, a position continued by the Hawke and
Keating Labor Governments.
The Fraser Government reacted to the start ofthe "Second Cold
War," prompted by the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and
increased arms expenditure under US Presidents Carter and Rea-
gan, by increasing Australian "defence" spending, offering in-
creased support facilities to the USA and increasing military ties
with Malaysia and Singapore..None ofthese steps was reversed by
the Hawke Government. But as Cheeseman and McKinley point
out, the Fraser Government "refused an American invitation to
participate in a Rapid Deployment Force which the US was raising
to counter further Soviet moves."lOO
As the decay of Russian military power became increasingly
apparent during the second half of the 1980s, the Hawke Govern-
ment and its Defence Minister Kim Beazley Gunior), formulated
and implemented defence policies that complemented the greater
outward orientation of economic management. Where Fraser
talked about reducing protectionism while raising levels ofsupport
for the least competitive industries, the Hawke Government pre-
sided over a period of rapid restructuring of Australian industry.
Lower tariffand quota protection was accompanied by measures to
promote increased international competitiveness, mainly by im-
proving labour productivity but also by encouraging strategic new
investment. Domestic rationalization provided the basis for more
corporations to internationalize their operations, notably in fmance,
transport and some areas of manufacturing. Labor's external policies
were designed to allow Australia to play a more aggressive role in the
western Pacific and southeast Asia and further afield, a "new Austra-
100 G. Cheeseman and M. McKinley, "Australia's Regional Security Policies,
1970-1990: Some Critical Reflections," Working Paper No. 101, Australian
National University Research, School of Pacific Studies, Peace Research
Centre, 14. This section draws heavily on the outline of developments
provided in Cheeseman and McKinley's paper.
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liarmilitarism. ,, 101 This involvedthe acquisitionofappropriatehard-
ware and deployment of aircraft to Malaysia and Singapore. The
Hawke Government also pursued longstanding Labor policies of
promoting strategic industries. It encouraged anns exports and re-
quired overseas suppliers ofmilitary hardware to undertake or contract
out work in Australia. There was also increased emphasis on using aid
. d' I 1 . hA' 102prOjects to encourage tra e, partlcu ar y WIt SIa.
After the collapse ofthe eastern European communist regimes in
1989, Australian Labor governments sought to influence the shape
ofthe changed world order. This not only involved encouraging the
USA to resume a more aggressive role as a global policeman,
prepared to intervene wherever governments or movements
seemed likely to challenge aspects of the existing order from
Somalia to the Balkans. Labor also encouraged Japan to take on
more international military "responsibilities." In foreign economic
policy the Labor Governments initiated the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation Process (APEC) as a multinational multiplier ofAus-
tralian influence, made systematic efforts to boost trade with south-
east and Northeast Asia and to increase Australia's own direct
influence in southeast Asia and with the island states ofthe Pacific.
The overall orientation of Australian foreign policy changed
little after the conservatives, under Liberal Prime Minister John
Howard, returned to office in March 1996. There were efforts to
make the US Alliance seem still tighter. But the resulting additional
joint exercizes did not change the relationship. The incompetent
101 See G. Cheeseman and St. J. Kettle, The New Australian Militarism (Sydney
1990); T. O'Lincoln, "The New Australian Militarism," Socialist Review, 4
(1991),27-47.
102 "An innovative trade-oriented aid deal by Australia with Manila has helped
BHP Co Ltd break back into the Philippine steel market with a $A5.3 million
export contract ... The deal gives weight to the push within the Australian
Government and industry for official aid to be angled towards the generation
of growth of Australian trade, especially with Asia." Australian Financial
Review, 5 July 1987.
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antics of "the boy on work experience,,103 who was Minister for
Foreign Affairs was the most notable development in Australian
foreign policy in the first months of the new Government. There
have been no major departures from Labor's approach.
Conclusion
Since its formation, the Labor Party has undergone important
changes104 and pursued various policies. The pace ofchange during
the long period of Labor government during the 1980s and 1990s
was particularly rapid. This was particularly the case for policies
on Australia's external relations. The ALP Governments re-
sponded to changes in world capitalism by reducing protectionism,
encouraging international competitiveness and the diversification
ofexports. This was accompanied by a more aggressive "defence"
policy. Between the end of the Cold War and Labor's defeat in
1996, Australia was directly engaged in military operations in the
Persian Gulf: Somalia and Cambodia, and indirectly in the war in
Bougainville. Labor encouraged the United States to maintain its
military presence in the western Pacific105 and Japan to play a large
role in the maintenance of world order.
But these policies and measures did not differ fundamentally
from Labor's earlier approach to foreign policy. Hence the Party's
role in establishing the foundations of Australia's armed forces
before 1914, and its enthusiasm for the slaughter of two World
Wars. Labor juggled bilateral relationships with powerful allies,
involvement in multilateral organizations and building up the coun-
try's own defence capacity during and after World War II. In the recent
103 Television satirist John Clark's description of Alexander Downer.
104 For recent developments see Tom Bramble, "Managers of Discontent."
105 For example, "Evans Presses Philippines to Keep US Bases," Australian
Financial Review, 26 January 1989: "The Australian position was that while
the future ofthe bases was a bilateral issue, it believed they should remain in
the Philippines for regional security reasons."
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past it similarly kept Australia's options open in terms of relation-
ships with the United States, Japan and APEC and Australia's
capacity to intervene militarily in the southwest Pacific and further
afield, aloneorwithallies.Norcantheshifts intheattitudeoftheLabor
Party's leadership to the Vietnam War be accounted for by nobler
principles than those which inform its policies today.I06
It is far more fruitful to seek explanations for the behaviour of
social democratic parties in their material circumstances than their
professed principles. We have seen that while changes in Austra-
lia's position in world capitalism have influenced Australian Labor
Party's foreign policy, the Party's overall approach has not shifted.
The pursuit of the "national interests" of capitalist Australia has
consistently underpinned the policies of the Labor party. Support
for repressive regimes and other imperialist powers, preparedness
to send Australian workers overseas to kill and be killed are nothing
new. They are integral to the social democratic tradition.
I am grateful to the anonymous left history referees, Tom Bramble,
David Glanz and particularly Tom 0 'Lincoln for their comments
on this article and, as always, to Mary Gormanfor her support.
106 Maddox, The Hawke Government and Labor Tradition, 200-1.
